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Abstract This paper critically analyzes the fiction-view of scientific modeling, which 
exploits presumed analogies between literary fiction and model building in science. 
The basic idea is that in both fiction and scientific modeling fictional worlds are 
created. The paper argues that the fiction-view comes closest to certain scientific 
thought experiments, especially those involving demons in science and to literary 
movements like naturalism. But the paper concludes that the dissimilarities prevail 
over the similarities. The fiction-view fails to do justice to the plurality of model types 
used in science; it fails to realize that a function like idealization only makes sense in 
science because models, unlike works of fiction, can be de-idealized; it fails to distin-
guish sufficiently between the make-believe (fictional) worlds created in fiction and 
the hypothetical (as-if) worlds envisaged in models. Representation characterized 
in the fiction-view as a license to draw inferences does not sufficiently distinguish 
between inferences in fiction from inferences in scientific modeling. To highlight the 
contrast the paper proposes to explicate representation in terms of satisfaction of 
constraints.
Keywords Abstraction, constraints, fiction-view, hypothetical worlds, idealization, 
models, representation.
DOI 10.1515/kjps-2016–0019
1. Introduction
It is commonly agreed today that scientific theories represent the exter-
nal world via models, of which there are many different kinds. Theories 
are very general in nature, whilst models represent particular systems. 
There are also different accounts of ‘representation’ – from isomorphism 
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and similarity to fit. In a recent development several writers (R. Frigg, P. 
Godfrey-Smith) have emphasized affinities between scientific modeling 
and literary fiction.
This new focus removes the representational force of models even 
further from previous accounts in terms of isomorphism and similarity. 
In this new approach, an argument by analogy is used to underline that 
both scientific models and literary fiction deal with ‘imaginary worlds’. 
The claim is that this analogy can shed new light on the role of model-
ing in the natural sciences.
The purpose of this contribution is to critically analyze this thesis: 
a) by testing it against a form of model, which is not often discussed 
in the literature, but seems close to the new approach (i.e., the use of 
demons in scientific thought experiments); b) by comparing it with liter-
ary examples, in particular the literary movement of naturalism. Thought 
experiments involving demons are used in both science and philoso-
phy as argument patterns to test the potential and limits of knowledge 
claims about the natural world. The paper will focus on Laplace’s and 
Maxwell’s demons. They present conceptual models, which allow their 
users to explore the coherence and consistency of accepted knowledge 
claims or to present bold new hypotheses, like Einstein’s hypothesis 
of the equivalence of inertial and gravitational mass. Einstein used his 
celebrated elevator thought experiment to illustrate his discovery. The 
demons of science, as well as naturalism, suggest themselves for a crit-
ical analysis of the fiction-view, because of their apparent closeness to 
the fictional account. The paper will therefore start with a sympathetic 
approach to the fiction-view of scientific modeling and, like the role of 
demons in scientific thinking, explore its potential. The first task will be 
to understand the thesis, namely the assumed close relationship between 
scientific modeling and literary fiction. Although the fictional nature of 
the demons of science, and realistic works of fiction, seem to support 
this view, it turns out that there are significant differences between mod-
eling in science and literary fiction. The proponents of the fiction-view 
tend to forget that there are no analogies without disanalogies. These 
disanalogies come to light with the notion of representation. Once these 
disanalogies are taken into account the similarities between these two 
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activities – telling fictional stories and constructing scientific models – 
are very superficial. The devil lies in the details. 
2. The Fiction-view of Scientific Modeling
The fiction-view of scientific modeling consists of two parts: on the 
negative side it rejects semantic and structuralist views of modeling, 
with their tendency to emphasize relations like isomorphism and sim-
ilarity between the model system and the target system. The latter is 
usually taken to be some aspect or part of the natural world. On the 
positive side it proposes to exploit analogies between model-systems 
and works of fiction. The central contention is that ‘models are akin to 
places and characters of literary fictions’, rather than, say, Vaihinger’s 
broader notion of fiction.1
The analogy is based on the claim that model-systems are often treated 
‘as imagined concrete things of literary fiction.’2 The main motivation for 
the fiction-view is threefold, according to Giere3:
a) Scientists sometimes invoke fictions, which envisage unrealizable or 
unrealized scenarios, as is certainly the case when demons are employed 
in scientific argumentation;
b) many scientific models are physically impossible to realize: think 
for instance of an idealized pendulum, friction-free surfaces in classical 
mechanics or indeed Einstein’s elevator thought experiment;
c) theoretical models represent idealized entities. This type of model 
has a long history: consider for instance planetary models, whether of 
the geocentric or heliocentric type, which employ circular orbits and 
neglect planetary moons.
The fiction-view gains further support from the extensive use of ide-
alizations and abstractions in scientific modeling. In abstraction, the 
human mind deliberately factors out certain parameters, which may have 
a measurable effect on the system under consideration. Thus Newton’s 
1 Frigg, 2010, 99; Fine, 1993
2 Godfrey-Smith, 2006, 736; cf. Godfrey-Smith, 2009, 91
3 Giere, 2008, §1; cf. Frigg, 2010, 100–103
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inverse square law of gravitation allows the computation of the gravi-
tational attraction between two particular bodies (say the Earth and the 
moon) but the gravitational influence of all other celestial bodies on the 
Earth-moon system is deliberately neglected, even though it exists.
In idealization, inaccuracies and small deviations are ‘straightened out’ 
in order to arrive at a pure type, which may be easier to describe or com-
pute. In many models of the solar system the orbit of planets is depicted 
as circular, even though it is elliptical to different degrees, because a 
circular orbit is easier to calculate than an elliptical one.
Due to these abstractions and idealizations models are ‘at a remove’ 
from the real target system. Hence it is tempting to say that they cre-
ate possible worlds or imaginary systems, which are analogous to fic-
tional accounts. Although scientific models are idealized systems, they 
nevertheless have the function of representing their target system. The 
proponents of the fiction-view understand representation in different 
ways: for instance indirect representation via similarity relations4 or as 
a license to draw ‘inferences from the model to the target system.’5 One 
question, which arises, is whether this representational element is also 
present in literary fiction or whether the inferences are of the same type 
in both cases.
The proposed similarity between literary fiction and scientific mod-
els further implies that there is no clear distinction between fictional 
accounts, thought experiments – as for instance in the use of demons – 
and scientific modeling.6 The reason for this fuzzy boundary between sci-
entific models, literary accounts and thought experiments is that literary 
and non-literary thought experiments can be understood as conceptual 
models. As such they have many similarities with other models: they 
contain abstractions and idealizations and therefore describe ‘fictional 
worlds’. But conceptual models in science also have representational 
functions because, like other scientific models, they aim at an investiga-
tion of real-world target systems.
4 Godfrey-Smith, 2006, Fn6
5 Frigg, 2010, Introduction
6 Frigg, 2010, 121–5
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In his analysis of the anatomy of scientific modeling, Frigg introduces 
a distinction between p-representation and t-representation.
P-representation ascribes properties to a fictional system. It is a 
description of an imaginary scenario, whereby a model system provides 
a description or attribution of fictional properties (but not, according to 
Frigg, fictional objects in order to avoid ontological commitments). This 
description should be ‘understood by way of props in games of make-be-
lieve’. This function gains its credibility from the pretense theory of fic-
tion. As a description is not inherently representational, a model must 
also be equipped with an additional representational function. 
T-representation carries the representational force of the model. A 
model system denotes a target system. It incorporates a relation between 
the model system and the target system. Frigg uses a map analogy to 
characterize t-representation:
“The view that I am proposing is that one can think of a 
model-system as a kind of “generalized map” and explain 
how it represents (t-represents) its target along the lines of 
how maps represent their targets.”7
As an example Frigg uses the Newtonian model of the sun-Earth sys-
tem. Its aim is to describe the Earth’s orbit around the sun. However, 
given the huge number of different models in the natural and social sci-
ences – from scale models, analogue models, conceptual models, func-
tional models, hypothetical (as-if) models, ideal types, structural models 
– the question arises whether the map-analogy captures the essence of 
scientific modeling in general. Frigg claims that
“‘model-systems are t-representations in the same way 
in which maps are: they denote a target system and cer-
tain facts obtain in them (…) which are then translated into 
claims about a target system by using a key.”8
In the case of scientific modelling two types of keys are highlighted.
7 Frigg, 2010, 100
8 Frigg, 2010, 128
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“The simplest of all keys is identity, the rule according 
to which facts in the model (or at least a suitably defined 
class of facts) are also facts in the world. For example, if 
X t-represents Y by identity, then it follows from the fact 
that X has discrete energy levels that Y has discrete energy 
levels too.”9
But identity has obvious limitations. A simple scale model of the solar 
system will represent the spatial distribution of the planets; it will often 
neglect its moons and present circular rather than elliptical orbits. It 
may not accurately represent the distances between the planets and 
their distance from the sun. Even a simple visible scale model will make 
abstractions from the real solar system and idealize their orbits to cir-
cular motion. The scale model is not a mirror image of the real system. 
A Newtonian model can also be a more abstract structural model, which 
combines algebraic and topological features, without being identical with 
the facts of the real system. The need for idealizations is stressed in the 
second example of a key.
“A more interesting key is the ideal limit key. Many mod-
el-systems are idealizations of the target in one way or an-
other. A common kind of idealizations is to “push to the 
extreme” a property that a system possesses. This happens 
when we model particles as point masses, strings as mass-
less, planets as spherical, and surfaces as frictionless.”10
Many models t-represent their target systems not only via idealization 
but also by way of abstraction. The fundamental idea is that model-sys-
tems are built to t-represent target-systems. The emphasis on systems 
highlights a further function of models. Models typically select a limited 
number of parameters in order to represent a relationship between them, 
either spatial ordering (topological features as in planetary models) or 
mathematical ordering (algebraic features as in atom models).11 This fur-
9 Frigg, 2010, 131; italics in original
10 Frigg, 2010, 131; italics in original
11 On algebraic and topological features in models, see Weinert, 1999
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ther function – let’s call it ‘systematization’ – is due to the fact that sci-
ence deals with systems (rather than disparate facts) and that a system 
consists of a certain number of components and an interaction between 
them. Thus the solar system consists of nine planets (including Pluto) 
and the way the planets interact with each other and with the sun either 
through gravitation (Newton) or the curvature of space-time (Einstein).
A further important feature of scientific modeling is that these func-
tions – abstraction, idealization, systematization – come in degrees, 
which means that features can be modified in more advanced models. 
This aspect of modeling will be called ‘factualization’. The existence of 
these functions in scientific models plays an important part in the eval-
uation of the fiction-view.
The fiction analogy only strictly applies to p-representation, since it is 
doubtful, as will be argued below, that most fictional accounts have a 
representational function in the way that scientific models do. An analy-
sis of the fiction-view of modeling must therefore operate on two levels. 
The first question is whether there is a strong enough similarity 
between p-representation in literary fiction and scientific modeling to 
justify the label ‘fiction-view’ of scientific modeling. The second question 
breaks down into two parts: why t-representation, as it exists in scientific 
models, does not feature in fictional accounts (with some exceptions); 
and whether scientific modeling is comparable to a map, with a given key. 
One serious problem with the claim that ‘models are akin to places and 
characters of literary fiction’ is that it glosses over the numerous types 
of models, which exist in science and therefore cannot capture what is 
distinct about scientific models.
As a first approach one is struck by several disanalogies between scien-
tific modeling and fictional accounts. It can be said that fictional accounts 
often describe an imaginary or possible world. Fiction tells stories, with 
evolving characters and plot lines; it creates characters and depicts sit-
uations. Scientific models lack these features. The difference between 
p-representation – the attribution of fictional attributes to the model – 
and t-representation – the denotation of a relation between model-system 
and target system – suggests that a distinction should be made between 
the fictional worlds in literary texts and the hypothetical worlds described 
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in scientific models. A fictional world is a make-believe possible world, 
the result of pure imagination. A hypothetical world is an as-if world, 
that is the model describes the world as if it consisted only of the com-
ponents and relations included in the model. Hence it employs abstrac-
tion, idealization and the other functions. (As discussed below certain 
sophisticated models in science also provide explanation.)
Most literary works require an interpretation on the part of the reader 
or viewer. But there is no true interpretation or one key to unlock a lit-
erary text. Literary texts mostly lack the representational function of 
scientific models. This lack of a representational function also accounts 
for a disanalogy between literary text and maps. The former cannot be 
approached via a particular key, which is typical for maps. A key for lit-
erary texts would mean that the key opens the door to the one interpre-
tation of the text (as is the case for maps). However, literary texts are 
typically open-ended and invite many different interpretations. Giere has 
pointed out that a failure of representation is a ground for criticism of a 
scientific model but not of a work of fiction.12
Frigg accepts that there are some ‘salient differences’ between liter-
ature and scientific modeling.13 Literary plots are complex, scientific 
modeling is often simple. Literary texts do not aim at a specific target 
system (with possibly one exception, as we shall see below). And aes-
thetic considerations play no role in scientific modeling.
The fact that fiction lacks a clear target system has a significant impli-
cation: a fictional world is a world of its own, in which there is no role for 
the intricate interplay between abstraction, idealization, systematization 
and factualization. This interplay means that many models are capable 
of de-idealization (or factualization). This particular feature is completely 
absent from fictional accounts.
Perhaps these disanalogies are just superficial differences. Perhaps the 
fiction-view is true of at least some scientific models, but not of others. 
To test the accuracy of the fiction-view, let us introduce some demons 
of science, as fictional characters; in particular Laplace’s and Maxwell’s 
12 Giere, 2008, §3
13 Frigg, 2010, 125
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Demons. (See Weinert 2016) The French mathematician and physicist 
Pierre-Simon Laplace invoked the services of a superhuman being – a 
Demon – to investigate the properties of a deterministic scientific the-
ory, like classical mechanics. To the Laplacean Demon, using the laws 
of classical physics, the whole universe appears like a long film strip, in 
which every frame, in the past, present and future, is already present.
In a famous thought experiment, involving ‘a being with superior facul-
ties’, James Clerk Maxwell attempted to show that the Second law of ther-
modynamics only possessed statistical validity. This being, later dubbed 
‘Maxwell’s Demon’, is able to ‘follow every molecule in its course’. In an 
appropriate setup such a being would be able, says Maxwell, to sort the 
molecules according to their respective velocities. The setup is simply 
a container, divided into two chambers by a partition, in which there is 
an opening. The Demon’s only work involves the opening and closing 
of the hole so as to allow only the swifter molecules to pass from A to 
B, and only the slower ones to pass from B to A.
4. Demons as Conceptual Models
A focus on demons highlights several facts:
• Demons are conceptual models, which come closest to the idea of 
fiction. It has been suggested that all thought experiments are argument 
types.14 It is questionable whether such a claim is true in its generality 
but thought experiments, like those involving demons, do contain argu-
ments regarding particular knowledge claims. At the same time one has 
to realize that conceptual models are only one type of model used in 
the natural and social sciences. There is of course no agreed category 
or classification of models in the sciences. It is unclear from the propo-
nents’ writings whether the fiction-view of models extends to all models 
in science. Consider, for instance, the functional model of demand and 
supply curves in economics, the analogue model of electric currents or 
as-if-models of planetary orbits – in all these cases it is difficult to see 
how the fiction-view can capture the essence of these models for they 
do not represent fictional worlds. It is more accurate to say that they 
14 Norton, 1996
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represent hypothetical scenarios. There is a difference between fictional 
worlds, which feature in literary works and hypothetical worlds, which 
feature in scientific models. Although the hypothetical worlds of scientific 
models are known to be non-existent, this feature is due to the depar-
ture – by degrees – from the real target systems, by way of abstraction, 
idealization etc. In fiction there are no calculated departures from the 
real world. On the other hand, there are certain types of literary fiction – 
especially the movement of naturalism – which come closer in their char-
acteristics to models in the sciences.
• Demons are hypothetical figures, only realizable in possible worlds; 
they only exist in our minds. They satisfy Giere’s threefold motivation. 
Demons are therefore ideally placed to test the ideas behind the fic-
tion-view of scientific modeling. Demons – like Laplace’s or Maxwell’s 
Demons – serve as thought experiments: their function is to test the 
coherence, consistency and extent of accepted knowledge claims, in this 
case classical physics. 
Laplace employs his Demon to underline his view that the classical 
world is completely deterministic. Laplace bestows three valuable hypo-
thetical attributes to his Demon:15
1. Computational omniscience, i.e. he is able to calculate both the past 
and future history of all systems – both micro- and macro-systems – from 
their current states of affairs. 
The Demon is able to enjoy computational omniscience because he 
possesses a second attribute.
2. Dynamical omniscience, i.e. he is able to determine the true, not 
an estimated time evolution of the system under consideration. In the 
Demon’s case ontological and predictive determinism coincide. The pre-
dictions he makes correspond precisely to the actual evolution of the 
system, the trajectory of which he calculates. There is no room for ran-
domness.
Finally the Demon possesses:
15 Frigg et al., 2014
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3. Observational omniscience, i.e. he is not only able to determine the 
initial data of the current state of affairs from which he will compute both 
the past and the future. Laplace’s Demon is a true inhabitant of the static 
Block Universe, since the whole vista of the course of the universe lies 
before his all-encompassing vision, like the frames of a film strip. Hence 
for the Demon Past, Present and Future seem equally real. 
Thus p-representation is satisfied. What about t-representation? The 
Laplacean Demon t-represents a classical deterministic world. The Demon 
t-represents this classical world in an idealized way. (His representation is 
idealized because determinism does not strictly hold in classical physics, 
as is most famously illustrated by the three-body problem.) It is a hypo-
thetical, not a fictional world because classical mechanics assumes that 
macro-systems exist in the real world and behave according to time-in-
variant deterministic laws.
Maxwell also bestows hypothetical properties on his Demon: he has 
the ability to sort slow from fast molecules. His aim is to disprove the 
original assumption that the Second law of thermodynamics is a deter-
ministic law. The Demon opens a trapdoor between two chambers A and 
B and only lets one type of molecule, say, fast ones enter chamber A. 
In this way the Demon heats up chamber A and cools chamber B. Most 
significantly Maxwell’s Demon sorts out the molecules without expen-
diture of energy (or so Maxwell claims) and thus achieves a violation of 
the Second law of thermodynamics, as it was understood in the 19th 
century (as a deterministic law). Again p-representation is satisfied and 
so is t-representation. Maxwell’s Demon represents an idealized thermo-
dynamic gas system. It is a hypothetical, not a fictional world because 
statistical mechanics assumes that micro-systems exist in the real world 
and behave according to time-invariant deterministic laws.
Although the Demons are idealizations, the intention of their creators 
is not to tell a story about a possible, if fictional world. The intention is 
to t-represent the real world: either the deterministic world of classical 
mechanics (Laplacean Demon) or the probabilistic world of statistical 
mechanics (Maxwell’s Demon). Novels and plays also denote possible 
worlds but they are particular fictional worlds, which mostly lack a par-
ticular target system. Yet exceptions exist. There are realistic novels or 
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plays, especially belonging to the literary movement of naturalism, which 
represent ‘real’ society. Historical novels belong to this category. Their 
fictional characters may be said to be idealizations. But they still lack a 
specific feature of scientific models – namely the interplay of abstraction, 
idealization, systematization and factualization. An important aspect 
in scientific modeling is that these functions come in degrees. Hence 
abstraction can be removed, idealization can be factualized, and sys-
tematization can be improved, making the model more realistic. Thus 
an analysis of classical physics has shown that it is not truly determinis-
tic, in the Laplacean sense; and an analysis of statistical mechanics has 
shown that the Maxwellian Demon must fail in his task of separating 
the fast from the slow molecules. The Demon himself is subject to the 
Second law.
Thus we have considered the fiction-view both from the point of view 
of the demons of science and from the perspective of (realistic) fic-
tion. Despite first impressions, demons, as conceptual models, do not 
really support the fiction-view of models, unless that view simply claims 
that scientific models often represent idealized worlds. But the ideal-
ized worlds of fictional accounts and scientific models are not the same 
worlds. Although the demons of science are conceptual models, which 
seem to approximate the fiction-view, they display both p-representa-
tion and t-representation. They represent hypothetical but not (purely) 
fictional worlds. Fiction, in general, has no particular target system in 
the real world. It depicts imaginary worlds, perhaps inspired by the real 
world. But realistic novels and plays can be said to have generalized tar-
get systems, like society or historical epochs. These types of conceptual 
models are more likely to support the fiction-view. Still, differences per-
sist. The differences between fictional worlds and hypothetical worlds 
become clearer when we turn to the question of representation, accord-
ing to which models connect theory with reality.
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4. Representation
Frigg characterizes representation as a license to draw inferences from 
a model to a target system.16 Suárez, too, describes representation as 
surrogate reasoning: infer some features of B (target system) by inves-
tigating A (source).17 But model construction can only occur when some 
information about the target system is available, either of a theoretical 
or empirical kind. As discussed below, atom models were constructed 
in order to make sense of the experimental observations about them. 
Once the models were available – Thomson’s plum pudding model and 
Rutherford’s nucleus model – it became possible to draw inferences 
about the target systems. Rutherford effectively inferred from his scat-
tering experiments that the plum pudding model was mistaken, since it 
could not account for the scattering of a-particles. Such inferences can 
go astray: the Greeks knew the orbital periods of the 6 known planets 
of antiquity and their order, with one exception: from their observations 
they placed the Earth at the centre and made the sun the third planet of 
their geocentric world view. Although the Greeks knew little about the 
planetary system their limited observational knowledge still acted as a 
constraint on their modeling exercises.
If models involve the drawing of inferences, namely from the model to 
the target system, then modeling involves the notion of representation. 
But in a scientific context more is needed than a license to infer. For a 
license to infer also exists in the fictional context: a reader of a novel, the 
spectator of a play, is licensed to infer certain lessons about what mes-
sage the novel or the play is intended to convey. The reader or spectator 
is invited to interpret the work of art. Take, for instance, Thornton Wild-
er’s play Our Town (1938). It is a play about the humdrum existence of 
people in a small American community. They follow their daily routines 
without much thought to the higher things in life. There are unfulfilled 
aspirations, like a trip to Paris. The characters go through the cycles 
of life – from love to loss, from little pleasures to great tragedies – as 
could be observed in any community. The twist of the play comes when 
16 Frigg, 2010, 98
17 Suarez, 2003, §3
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some of the town characters die and are seen to gather in the afterworld 
from which they observe the goings-on in the town below on Earth. They 
observe proceedings with much incomprehension. Their most striking 
comment is: ‘they do not understand!’ As spectators we are licensed to 
infer a lesson about life: that often we do not see the wood for the trees; 
that we get lost in petty details without realizing that there may be higher 
aspirations in life, grander views to contemplate. That is, we are licensed 
to interpret the message of the play, which may not be identical with 
the intention of the author. Such an interpretation may not be shared 
by other viewers or they may put the emphasis on other features of the 
play. A literary text is deliberately open-ended; it is an invitation to the 
readers or spectators to make their own sense of proceedings.
What is different in scientific representation is that it requires a certain 
amount of objectivity. How can we capture this objectivity, which acts 
as a constraint on model building? A must have an underlying structure 
which allows agents to draw specific inferences about B.18 According to 
Frigg, models represent phenomena since ‘science is about phenome-
na’.19 These phenomena are represented in models, and we are to think 
of models as ‘generalized maps’. This leads to a two-fold ambiguity of 
the fiction-view. On the one hand we are to think of models as ‘akin to 
places and characters in fiction’; on the other hand, we are to think of 
models as ‘generalized maps’. Maps come with particular keys but liter-
ary texts are open-ended. It is this open-endedness which makes them 
unable to provide a particular key of how to interpret them. Maps do 
come with particular keys and do represent particular target systems. 
They are not open-ended. But scientific models, although they represent 
particular target systems, lack particular keys: neither ‘identity’ nor ‘ide-
alizations’ are precise keys and they are not exhaustive.
Unlike Thornton Wilder’s fictional town, a ‘map’ aims to represent a 
real system: an underground map of a big city represents, in an ideal-
ized fashion, not only the train lines and their terminals but the individ-
ual stations at which the trains will stop, the geographic direction of the 
18 Suárez, 2004, §3
19 Frigg, 2010, 110
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line (from east to west, from north to south) and the interchanges. That 
is the maps of the underground trains are much more constrained than 
Thornton Wilder’s fictional account of his ‘little town’. Maps can also be 
improved or ‘factualized’, unlike fictional works.
As mentioned above, Frigg speaks of identity and ideal limits as exam-
ples of keys in scientific models. These keys are mere hypothesis and 
according to Frigg, little work has been done on keys. Therefore, Frigg 
soon distances himself from this thesis: scientific representation rarely 
comes with a key. But is a key needed to relate certain properties of the 
model to properties of the target system? R. Giere has introduced the 
notion of ‘fit’ into the discussion to capture the representational relation 
between model and world. 
It is not the model that is doing the representing; it is the scientist 
using the model who is doing the representing. One way scientists do 
this is by picking out some specific features of the model that are then 
claimed to be similar to features of the designated real system to some 
(perhaps fairly loosely indicated) degree of fit. It is the existence of the 
specified similarities that makes possible the use of the model to repre-
sent the real system in this way.20
Giere describes ‘fit’, in an unspecified sense, as agreement with data. 
That is, claims about ‘good fit’ do not function as fictitious claims.21 Giere 
still envisages a loose sense of similarity as the relation between models 
and the world. But we should take into consideration that notions like 
isomorphism and similarity do not really explain the representation of 
reality by a model.22 Suárez has shown that both similarity and isomor-
phism do not possess the logical properties of representation. Represen-
tation is non-symmetric, non-transitive and non-reflexive. But similarity 
is reflexive and symmetric and isomorphism is reflexive, systematic and 
transitive. Furthermore isomorphism (the structure of A is isomorphic to 
the structure of B) cannot account for inaccurate representation, whilst 
similarity cannot account for idealized representation. The demons do 
20 Giere, 2004, §4.1; cf. Bailer-Jones, 2003
21 Giere, 2008, §3
22 Suárez, 2003; 2004; 2010;cf. Frigg, 2010
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not represent their target system in the sense of isomorphism or simi-
larity. In fact, isomorphism and similarity are neither necessary nor suf-
ficient for representation. One should add that notions like isomorphism 
and similarity are either used as primitives or fail to specify the degrees 
of abstraction, idealization and factualization, which clearly operate in 
the case of models.
Thus the notions of ‘fit’ (Giere) or ‘key’ (Frigg) are still underdeveloped. 
But Giere also observes that scientific principles and specific conditions 
constrain the structure of models. In what follows I propose to elaborate 
and explicate the notions of ‘fit’ and ‘key’ in terms of ‘satisfaction of 
constraints’. The constraints set up a constraint space into which mod-
els try to fit. Fit means that the model structure successfully accommo-
dates the available constraints.23 Fit, in terms of constraints, secures the 
objectivity involved in scientific models.
First, constraints will be understood generally as restrictive conditions 
on admissibility. Admittance to certain clubs carries age or even gender 
limits. Admissible are only those who satisfy these particular constraints. 
Similarly, constraints operate on scientific models and theories, which 
limit the admissible input of data. They create ‘logical spaces’, in which 
models are to be accommodated.
We can distinguish between empirical constraints, theoretical con-
straints and metaphysical constraints. Empirical constraints consist of 
(partial) data consistency, fundamental physical constants, and empiri-
cal laws. Theoretical constraints consist of internal consistency, external 
coherence, mathematical requirements (like differentiability or discrete-
ness) and methodological norms (like testability). Einstein, for instance, 
imposed four constraints on scientific theories:
• The invariance of the velocity of light, c, in vacuum;
• The Special and General Relativity principles;
• Invariance and symmetries;
• Covariance (or form invariance).
23 Weinert 2000; Weinert 2006; cf. Bailer-Jones, 2009, Ch. VI, VIII
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The invariance of the velocity of light was at first simply an empirical 
constraint but Einstein turned it into a postulate of the Special theory of 
relativity. Metaphysical constraints, as conveyed by Laplace’s and Max-
well’s Demons, consist of fundamental views about nature, like deter-
minism or indeterminism, continuity or discontinuity in nature. As con-
straints change over time, different constraint structures give rise to 
different logical spaces. It should be immediately obvious that fictional 
accounts satisfy far fewer constraints than scientific models. One expects 
fiction to be internally coherent in the development of the narrative, 
although even this constraint may be violated. There is no limitation on 
fictional accounts to respect the constraints of physical possibility. For 
instance, in the film Avatar the image of floating mountains takes the 
viewers by surprise. Note that Laplace’s and Maxwell’s Demons do not 
violate the laws of physical possibility.
Fit comes in degrees because the constraint space can be manipu-
lated by introducing further or more specific constraints. But the more 
constraints a model satisfies the better is its chance of representational 
accuracy. Fit means that the model structure successfully accommodates 
the empirical and theoretical constraints. Models, like the demons, often 
reflect metaphysical constraints. Constraints should enhance a model’s 
representational force. But an important requirement is that the con-
straints themselves must be accurate. How this particular feature works 
differentially can be gleaned, as discussed below, from the contrast 
between the history of geocentrism and the evolution of atom models. 
Fit also has a pragmatic dimension. It is dependent on the availability 
of constraints and their interplay. Consider, for instance, the Laplacean 
Demon. As a conceptual model, the Demon represents a completely 
deterministic classical world. The Laplacean Demon can be thought of 
as a superhuman scientist who can explore the resources of classical 
physics to such an extent that he uses it as a deterministic theory repre-
senting a presumably deterministic world. As it turns out, however, when 
the limits of classical physics are explored it is not as deterministic as 
the Laplacean Demon pretends. When the constraints are tightened and 
they themselves attain empirical and theoretical validity, a model which 
accommodates the constraints, is likely to be a good representation of 
the target system.
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This tightening of the constraint space is absent from fictional accounts. 
Novels, plays are taken at face value – it is not part of the interpretation 
whether they accurately represent a target system. What matters is their 
internal consistency and the depiction of the characters. As mentioned 
above, Thornton Wilder’s Our Town tells the story of the fictional Amer-
ican small town of Grover’s Corners between 1901 and 1913 through 
the everyday lives of its citizens. It is not part of the interpretation of 
Wilder’s fictional town to ask whether it accurately represents an Amer-
ican town. It could depict any town, at least in the Western World. The 
only question, which is asked, is about the internal consistency of the 
character development. This facet is even more striking in the case of 
very abstract plays, like Beckett’s Happy Days (1960). The play has two 
characters, Winnie and her husband Willie. In Act I, Winnie is embedded 
waist-deep in a low mound under blazing light, with a large black bag 
beside her. She is woken by a piercing bell, and begins her daily rou-
tine with a prayer. She prattles incessantly to her husband Willie, who 
is hidden from view behind the mound and is mostly taciturn. In Act II 
Winnie’s situation seems to have worsened since she has now sunk up 
to her neck in the mound. But she does not seem to realize or to mind, 
since the incessant flow of her words does not stop or even decelerate. 
The play depicts a situation, which the viewer is invited to interpret. But 
it does not represent a particular target system; it does not provide a 
key. Winnie and Willie do not represent real people, their mound does 
not represent a real home. The play is about a message, not about an 
accurate or inaccurate representation of a target system.
The constraint space, which operates on scientific models, covers 
both what Frigg calls p-representation and t-representation. When pro-
ponents of the fiction-view suggest that a model-system describes fic-
tional characteristics, their statement hides an ambiguity. Do they mean 
‘fictional’ in the sense of an imaginary, make-believe world or do they 
mean an as-if, ‘hypothetical’ world in the sense of abstraction, idealiza-
tion, systematization and factualization? The fiction-view conflates this 
distinction. Whilst Laplace’s and Maxwell’s Demons possess superhu-
man characteristics – the ability to predict and retrodict all micro- and 
macro-events of the classical world or the ability to sort molecules at will 
according to their speed – these characteristics are not purely fictional; 
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they are idealizations of human predictive and manipulative capacities. 
Similar constraints operate on t-representation because, by definition, 
it spells out a relation between the model system and the target system. 
A good model seeks a close fit to the target system by satisfying a num-
ber of constraints, as a brief excursion into the history of atom models 
will show below. Such constraints do not generally operate on fictional 
accounts.
There are certain literary movements – in particular naturalism at the 
end of the 19th century with representatives like E. Zola and G. Haupt-
mann – which come closer to the fiction-view of scientific modeling than 
other literary genres. Naturalistic novels and plays use detailed realism 
to expose the hardship of life, including poverty, violence and disease, 
of the lower classes. Such naturalistic works of art resemble scientific 
models in that they ascribe certain realistic characteristics to the char-
acters who, in the author’s view, live in unacceptable social conditions. 
Hauptmann’s play The Weavers (1892) portrays a group of Silesian weav-
ers who stage an uprising in 1844 to protest against the exploitation and 
inhumane treatment in the wake of the Industrial Revolution. The play 
has a concrete target system, namely the life of a community of weavers 
in a particular part of Germany but it is not a socio-economic history of 
that community. Naturalism imposes more constraints on itself than do 
other literary movements. Scientific models do not have the liberty to 
dispense with constraints. At the opposite end of naturalism stands the 
work of a writer like Samuel Beckett whose novels and plays belong to 
the movement of the absurd. His characters have imaginary and unrealis-
tic features, with no pretence that they may depict reality. Nevertheless, 
they contain messages about reality, which the viewer must infer in an 
act of interpretation. Perhaps the message of Happy Days – but this is 
an interpretation – is that humans gloss over the absurdity of the human 
condition by trivial small talk. 
To say that scientific models are analogous to fiction is to neglect 
that where there is an analogy there is also a disanalogy. If fit is under-
stood in terms of satisfaction of constraints it becomes clear that most 
fictional accounts are subject to very few constraints. But in order to 
secure a representation of a target system by a model system, in order 
to make representation successful, a model system is subject to a num-
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ber of constraints. These constraints are of course flexible and change 
over time. With the introduction of new constraints a model can improve 
its representation. For instance one of the major preconditions for the 
success of heliocentrism was the replacement of the Aristotelian theory 
of motion by the medieval impetus theory of motion. The impetus the-
ory allowed the nominalist philosophers at the University of Paris, and 
indeed Copernicus, to parry some of the major Greek objections against 
a moving Earth. They were based on the Aristotelian theory of motion, 
according to which everything that moves needs a mover; and material 
objects like the Earth have a natural place (the centre) to which they 
would strive to return if they were removed from it. The Aristotelian the-
ory of motion had allowed the Greeks to reject the notion of a moving 
Earth. For if the Earth moved, contrary to its natural rest, violent winds 
would blow from east to west, buildings would crumble and birds would 
never be seen to fly from west to east. Also objects would not fall straight 
down to the bottom of a tower. As none of these things were observed, 
the Greeks concluded that the Earth was stationary. The impetus theory 
allowed the medieval scholastics to point out that the atmosphere, the 
tower, all earthly objects moved along with a naturally rotating Earth. 
The Earth thus had a natural impetus which bestowed, as we would say 
today, inertial motion on the physical systems on the surface of the Earth. 
This shows that if a model is based on inaccurate constraints – like the 
Aristotelian theory of motion – its representational accuracy will suffer.
The history of atom models reveals the opposite effect, namely how 
improved constraints lead to better models of the atom. The case of atom 
models confirms that representation can only be achieved if the model 
builder already possesses some knowledge of the target system. Import-
ant models of the constitution of the atom were introduced between 
1897 – the year Thomson discovered the electron – and 1911, when 
Rutherford inferred the existence of atomic nuclei from the experimen-
tal evidence of the so-called scattering experiments. The atom models 
ranged from poly-electron models to pair models, from Nagaoka’s Satur-
nian model to Rutherford’s nucleus model.24 It is important to realise that 
efforts to build atom models of increasing agreement with experimental 
24 See Heilbron, 1981; Pais, 1986, Ch. 9; Weinert, 2000
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data were driven by the need to interpret the mounting experimental 
data. That is, the models were inferred from the experimental data, with 
little theoretical guidance, since there was no viable theory prior to the 
emergence of the new quantum mechanics in 1925.25 The two types of 
atom models, which will be of particular importance for the discussion in 
this paper, are Thomson’s plum pudding model and Rutherford’s nucleus 
model. Rutherford’s model of the atom succeeded Thomson’s in more 
than a chronological sense. It was Rutherford’s use of an inference to 
the most likely explanation, which put an end to the career of the plum 
pudding model. It will be useful to characterise these two models briefly.
• Thomson’s atom model had electrons but no nucleus. The electrons 
were arranged in rings, embedded in a positive sphere of electrification. 
(Analogy: the electrons are like plums swimming in a custard sauce.) 
But for the sake of stability, this model must be dynamic. The electrons 
move in rings at an angular velocity, w. As we go from the inside of the 
sphere outwards, the number of electrons on the rings increases. There 
is a spatial order among the rings to guarantee the stability of the atom. 
The Thomson model was able to cut the number of electrons, which 
were supposed to exist in the atom. Early speculations had placed thou-
sands of electrons even in the hydrogen atom. By relating the number 
of electrons, n, in an atom to the atomic weight, A, Thomson drastically 
reduced the number of electrons, arriving at approximately one for the 
hydrogen atom. It turned out to be one of the reasons for the demise 
of the plum pudding model that the number of electrons in an atom is 
not determined by the atomic weight, A, but by the atomic number Z. It 
was the strength of the Rutherford model that it could account for this 
relationship.
• The striking feature of the Rutherford model (1911) was that it 
acquired a nucleus. This was dictated by experiment. Rutherford worried 
little about the electrons in the atom, because due to their small mass, 
they could not be responsible for the scattering, in some cases spectac-
ular, which had been observed. In these scattering experiments, a-par-
ticles (helium atoms stripped of their 2 electrons) were fired at atoms 
25 Born, 1949, 86
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in a thin layer of gold. All kinds of scattering angles were observed, but 
the most surprising result was that 1 in 8000 a-particles suffered deflec-
tions of more than ninety degrees. This was difficult to accommodate 
on the Thomson model. Rutherford explained that ‘the mass, momen-
tum and kinetic energy of the a-projectile (were) very large compared 
with the corresponding value of the electron in rapid motion.’26 It was 
difficult to imagine that the electrons could deflect the massive a-parti-
cles. By contrast, if the atom acquired a nucleus, with a strong central 
charge, the deflection could easily be explained. If the a-particle, with 
positive charge, passes through the charged field of the nucleus, it will 
be deflected at an angle, which depends on the closeness of the approach 
to the nucleus. Using these results, and the relationship between n and 
Z, Rutherford used said inference to discredit the Thomson model. Note 
that in the absence of a theory of atoms, Rutherford’s nucleus model 
provided an explanation of large angle-scattering.
Whilst scientific models undergo change (they can be discarded – like 
the geocentric model – or improved – like atom models) as a result of the 
interplay of constraints, this is not the case with fictional accounts. It is 
a legitimate objection against scientific models that they disregard cer-
tain constraints, which can lead to their abandonment. But the excessive 
abstraction of Beckett’s plays and novels is not a valid objection against 
their literary value. Berthold Brecht’s play The Life of Galileo (1945–47) is 
a fictionalized yet realistic account of Galileo’s struggle with the Catholic 
Church. Even Brecht’s play about Galileo gives a very biased account of 
the behaviour of the Catholic Church and their representatives. They are 
depicted as the forces of reaction and orthodoxy throwing spanners in 
the wheels of the enlightened Galileo. The reality was more complex. A 
scientific model will be criticized for the poor representation of its target 
system; a work of fiction will at best be criticized for the poor execution 
of its plot and delineation of its characters.
26 Rutherford, 1911, 252–3
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5. Analogies and Disanalogies
The fiction-view relies on the existence of certain analogies between 
fiction and scientific models, especially the attribution of imaginary char-
acteristics, which in the case of scientific models is due to the role of 
abstraction and idealization. A literary movement like naturalism comes 
closest to the role of scientific modeling but it is only one of many lit-
erary movements. The analogies are outweighed by the disanalogies, 
which come to light when the many different types of scientific models 
are taken into consideration. Works of fiction are final but scientific mod-
els undergo modification; the introduction of new constraints can lead 
to their refinement, as for instance in the case of atom models. De-ide-
alization is an important feature of scientific modeling but it is absent 
from literary fiction. The constraint structure is very different in each 
case: most fictional works are only subject to a few internal constraints, 
like logical consistency, but most scientific models are subject to both 
internal constraints (like logical consistency and mathematical require-
ments) and external constraints (like coherence and testability). With a 
few exceptions, like the literary movement of naturalism, literary works 
of art fail to represent a clear, specific target system. But in the absence 
of clear target systems, it is impossible – as is the case with literary fic-
tion – to assess degrees of abstraction and idealization, hence the extent 
of factualization, which operates in the case of many scientific models. 
Most planetary models assume circular orbits because a circular orbit is 
easier to compute than an ellipsis. But it is well known how much partic-
ular planets deviate from circularity: The eccentricity of the Earth’s orbit 
is currently about 0.0167, which makes the Earth’s orbit nearly circular. 
Mercury has the greatest orbital eccentricity of any planet in the Solar 
System (e=0.2056). By contrast it makes little sense to ask by how much 
Beckett’s, Hauptmann’s or Wilder’s plays deviate from ‘reality’.
The ascription of certain imaginary, fictional or unrealistic features – 
p-representation – which seems to be present in both scientific models 
and literary fiction invites the analogy, on which the fiction-view of sci-
entific modeling is based. But this similarity is very superficial. In scien-
tific models we observe a depiction of hypothetical scenarios, with an 
interplay of abstraction, idealization, systematization and factualization, 
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which make scientific models much more adaptable than literary fiction. 
In literary fiction there simply is no such interplay: works of fiction are 
not subject to the introduction or the refinement of newer constraints. 
Very few restrictive conditions operate on literary fiction – they are not 
accommodated in well-defined constraint spaces. The only valid similar-
ity between works of fiction and models in science is their use of ’imag-
ined concrete things’. But the similarity of this function glosses over a 
distinction between fictional features in literary works and hypothetical 
features in scientific models.
In most literary works of art there is no t-representation, as required in 
scientific models, let alone a key to the interpretation of the text. In the 
case of scientific models it is equally doubtful whether there is a particu-
lar key, as Frigg admits, to their representational function. The reason is 
the number of models, which are in circulation in science. A scale model 
of the planetary system does not t-represent in the same way, as say, a 
functional supply-and-demand model in economics. This paper has pro-
posed that notions like fit and ‘key’ can be expressed in terms of the 
constraints, which the models must satisfy. Frigg envisages two keys: 
identity and ideal limits. If identity is required – which Frigg describes 
as the agreement of certain facts about the models, say discreteness in 
atom models, with facts about atoms – then this limited identity can be 
expressed in terms of the constraints, which are imposed on the model. 
(This ‘identity’ cannot be complete because of the unavoidable idealiza-
tion in models.) Scale models tend to agree with certain features of the 
target system – the scale model of a bridge or the solar system shares 
topological features with the target system – but the notion of identity 
fails to capture the degree, to which the model ‘resembles’ the target 
system. A scale model of the solar system can be made more precise by 
the addition of further constraints: the inclusion of moons, the inclusion 
of all the known planets but it cannot properly capture the ‘distance-or-
bit’ relationship. The notion of constraint also expresses the ‘key’ of 
ideal limits better: for instance, the ideal pendulum can be shown to be 
a limit of the physical pendulum by abstracting from certain features: 
the period of an ideal pendulum – – is only dependent on the length of 
the string, l, and the gravitational constant, g, but not on its mass. The 
ideal pendulum, which is a model of a real pendulum, abstracts from 
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the mass of the oscillating bob (and the string), and idealizes the string 
to a weightless, inextensible cord of length, l. These abstractions and 
idealizations can be lifted to make the model more realistic.
Finally, the fiction-view is a hybrid: it emphasizes the attribution of 
fictional characteristics, from which it derives its name. It does not suf-
ficiently distinguish between imaginary characteristics, which are purely 
fictional, and hypothetical characteristics, which are abstracted or ideal-
ized from real target systems. But it cannot neglect the representational 
function of models, which are absent from (most) fictional works of art. 
So it introduces the map analogy. But maps usually have just one key, 
whilst scientific models are said to exhibit the example keys of ‘identity’ 
and ‘ideal limit’. But in the language of constraints, models have many 
‘keys’ but keys do not possess the adaptability of constraints. The struc-
ture of specific target systems acts as an important constraint on the 
objectivity of models in science but no literary critic would criticize the 
lack of objectivity in, say, Beckett’s plays. However, if naturalistic novels 
or plays were to depart too much from their target system, they would 
fail in their task of depicting a real-life situation. The fiction-view shares 
similarities with certain literary movements and conceptual models in 
the sciences but the negative outweigh the positive analogies. This view 
is not true of scientific models in general.
6. Conclusion
The paper has analyzed the fiction-view of scientific modeling and con-
cluded that the disanalogies outweigh the analogies. The analogies show 
certain similarities between the fiction-view and thought experiments 
involving demons, on the one hand, and the literary movement of natu-
ralism on the other. But the function of representation shows that scien-
tific modeling is quite different from fiction-writing: it aims at particular 
target systems; it exploits the interplay between abstraction, idealiza-
tion, factualization and systematization to great effect; and it is subject 
to many constraints. The paper has proposed to analyze the notion of 
representation in terms of ‘satisfaction of constraints’, as more precise 
than the notions of ‘fit’ or ‘keys’. Scientific models are about hypothet-
ical worlds, not fictional worlds.
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